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THE LAST BROODING OMNIPRESENCE: ERIE RAILROAD CO. v. 
TOMPKINS AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PREEMPTIVE 
FEDERAL MARITIME LAW 
ERNEST A. YOUNG* 
Justice Holmes said in 1917 that “[t]he common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign . . . that can 
be identified.”1  This understanding is central to the way we think about law 
today, and it laid the groundwork for Justice Brandeis’ later pronouncement, in 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case 
is the law of the State. . . .  There is no federal general common law.”2 
What people outside the admiralty community tend to forget, however, is 
that Holmes was in dissent.  The fight he was losing was Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Jensen, which held that the general common law of admiralty preempted 
contrary state law, even though no federal statute or constitutional provision 
spoke to the question at issue.3  And while Holmes’ condemnation of brooding 
omnipresences in Jensen is no less accepted today as a matter of general 
jurisprudence than his rejection of economic substantive due process in 
Lochner v. New York,4 the Jensen doctrine remains good law in admiralty.5  
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.  This paper was originally 
presented at the meeting of the Maritime Section of the Association of American Law Schools in 
New Orleans on January 8, 1999, at which time I was Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at 
Villanova University School of Law.  I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for inviting me to present 
this paper at the AALS meeting, and to Heather Gerken, Marc Goldman, John Gotanda, Mike 
Rosenthal, Michael Sturley, and Kim Vasconi for helpful comments on this version of the paper.  
I have also benefited from conversations with Jonathan Gutoff, David Robertson, and Louise 
Weinberg.  Finally, I would like to thank Professors Robert Force and Steven Friedell not only for 
their many insights, but also for dealing so graciously with one new to the maritime field.  For a 
more extended treatment of this subject, see Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999). 
 1. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 2. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 3. 224 U.S. at 217-18. 
 4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(rejecting economic substantive due process). 
 5. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 n.1 (1994) (refusing “to 
overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation”).  Of course, with 
endorsements like this, Jensen may not need critics. 
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The result is that despite Erie, there remains a general federal common law of 
admiralty that exists wholly apart from federal statutes or constitutional 
provisions.  There is still, in David Robertson’s phrase, a “brooding 
omnipresence” over the sea.6 
The Jensen rule reflects the federal courts’ effort to fit the “general” 
common law of admiralty into a post-Erie framework that recognizes only two 
kinds of law: state and federal.7  By shoehorning maritime law into the 
“federal” box, Jensen created a broad rule of preemption that allows federal 
courts to preempt state regulatory authority without grounding their decisions 
in a federal statute or constitutional provision.  My argument is that this broad 
rule of maritime preemption is unconstitutional. 
It may help to start with a concrete case that can serve as a basis for 
discussion.  In 1989, a tanker inappropriately named the “World Prodigy” ran 
aground in Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, spilling over 300,000 gallons of 
heating oil into the bay.  Although authorities did a fairly good job of promptly 
cleaning up the spill, the cleanup operation basically shut down the Bay for a 
period of two weeks.  Because much of Rhode Island’s economy depends on 
the Bay, many people were hurt by even the temporary shutdown of access.  In 
Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, a group of shellfish dealers who lost 
money because of the spill sued the shipping company to recover their losses.8 
The shellfish dealers based their claims on Rhode Island’s Compensation 
Act,9 which held shipowners liable for any harms arising from negligence or 
violations of state pilotage and pollution laws, including purely economic 
losses.10  The problem with the plaintiffs’ state law claim was that federal 
maritime law dictated a contrary result.  In the 1927 case of Robins Dry Dock 
& Repair Co. v. Flint—ironically also authored by Justice Holmes—the 
Supreme Court said that the general maritime law did not permit recovery of 
purely economic losses in cases of maritime tort.11  The question in Ballard 
 
 6. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF 
PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 193 
(1970). 
 7. In this sense, Justice Holmes misunderstood the majority’s project in Jensen: Justice 
McReynolds’ majority opinion in fact rejected the idea of law as a “brooding omnipresence” that 
need not be grounded in either a state or federal source.  Jensen is to this extent a precursor of 
Erie.  But Justice Holmes was also condemning the idea of law that was “general” in the sense of 
untethered judicial lawmaking.  In that sense, Holmes’s view prevailed in Erie—federal courts 
generally have no lawmaking power apart from federal statutes—and Jensen is the anomaly. 
 8. 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 9. Id. at 624 (citing Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act, R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 46-12-3 (1998)). 
 10. By purely economic losses, I mean losses to persons who can’t show any physical injury 
to their property.  The shellfish dealers, for instance, didn’t own the Bay or the beaches that were 
hurt; they simply couldn’t purchase shellfish from fishermen in the Bay as a result of the spill. 
 11. 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927). 
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Shipping was whether the Robins Dry Dock rule preempted the Rhode Island 
statute. 
Ballard Shipping poses the central problem of maritime preemption very 
starkly.  The Robins Dry Dock rule is purely a rule of general common law – it 
has no even arguable relationship to any federal statute or constitutional 
provision.  The Rhode Island Compensation Act is a classic state police power 
statute, protecting what may be Rhode Island’s most vital resource.  
Preemption of state law ordinarily requires not only a federal statute but also a 
clear statement of Congress’s intent to preempt state law.12 Nonetheless, under 
Jensen, the shipping company had a strong argument for preemption of the 
Rhode Island statute. 
I. THE ADMIRALTY LAW BACKGROUND 
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends “[t]he judicial Power” “to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”13  Note that there’s no 
substantive grant of lawmaking authority either here or in Article I.  The 
federal courts’ common lawmaking powers in admiralty have been implied 
from the jurisdictional grant, and Congress’s own lawmaking authority has 
been implied from that of the courts.14 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 implemented the jurisdictional grant by 
conferring “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and 
 
 12. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 14. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959).  
I resist Professor Friedell’s suggestion that the admiralty grant is uniquely “based not on the 
status of the parties but on the subject matter of the dispute.”  Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse 
Nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1389, 1391 (1999).  See also J. John R. 
Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 251 
(1993) (making the same point).  After all, Article III defines the general federal question 
jurisdiction in subject-matter terms, yet the courts have soundly rejected the proposition that this 
confers a general common lawmaking power on the federal courts.  See Texas Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (noting that federal common lawmaking 
powers are “few and restricted”).  Moreover, the current version of the “subject matter” test for 
admiralty jurisdiction is administered so loosely as to make admiralty jurisdiction largely a 
question of locality.  See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 373 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Thomas C. Galligan, The Admiralty Extension Act at Fifty, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 495, 
506 (1998) (“When water is present it will be a rare case in which a party asserting maritime 
jurisdiction will not be able to at least make a colorable argument for jurisdiction based upon its 
characterization of the relevant incident and activity.”).  Admiralty, in other words, is largely a 
place—not a subject.  Finally, even if Professor Friedell’s suggestion were correct, the subject-
based nature of the jurisdictional grant would be significant for preemption purposes only if the 
subject were inherently federal.  The Supreme Court held early on that it was not.  See American 
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1352 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1349 
maritime jurisdiction” on the federal district courts.15  The exclusivity of this 
grant was qualified, however, by something called the “Saving Clause,” which 
“sav[es] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the 
common law is competent to give it.”16  The Saving Clause is generally taken 
to mean two things.  Most maritime claims can be brought in state court; and  
there is at least some potential role for state law in admiralty cases whether in 
state court or federal court.17 
Jensen narrowed the role of state law in admiralty by holding that “no 
[state] legislation is valid if it . . . works material prejudice to the characteristic 
features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and 
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”18  There has 
been some dispute about what that formula means precisely, but two points 
stand out: First, it is frequently interpreted—especially by lower courts—to 
mean that federal common law governs whenever admiralty jurisdiction is 
present, regardless of contrary state law.19  And second, however Jensen is 
construed, its preemption rule is different from the rules that govern 
preemption questions in all other contexts—and considerably broader. 
The Jensen question goes straight to the nature of federal common law 
generally.  As I’ve said, admiralty law is the last survivor of an earlier way of 
thinking about law.  It is, in other words, another form of “general” common 
law much like the general commercial law articulated in the Nineteenth 
Century under Swift v. Tyson.20  For this reason, the legitimacy of Jensen must 
be evaluated within a broader context that includes both the historical learning 
about general law under Swift and modern constitutional doctrine concerning 
federal common law and preemption. 
II. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST JENSEN 
The “prima facie” case against Jensen’s strong rule of maritime 
preemption begins with Erie, which I read as announcing a principle of judicial 
federalism: While the Commerce Clause would probably have covered the law 
 
 15. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789).  The modern version is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 
(1994). 
 16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(a), 1 Stat. 77 (1789). 
 17. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 57 (1959) (discussing state court suits); David W. Robertson, Federalism and 
Uniformity in Maritime Laws: The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases after Yamaha 
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 84 (1996) (suggesting that the saving clause 
“express[es] what the Court has taken as a quasi-constitutional commitment to achieving the 
proper mix of state and federal law in the maritime realm”). 
 18. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216. 
 19. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 
1985) (en banc). 
 20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
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at issue in Erie, even in 1938, courts have no power to go first in making 
federal law.21  In a post-Garcia world, the separation of powers principle that 
only Congress makes federal law protects federalism as well by channeling 
lawmaking decisions into the institution where the States are represented 
directly.22 
Of course, it wasn’t long after Erie before courts and commentators 
acknowledged the continued existence of what Judge Friendly called the “new 
federal common law.”23  Unlike the “general” common law that existed prior 
to Erie, this law was tied either to federal statutes (like the antitrust laws) or to 
particular federal interests like foreign relations or the proprietary dealings of 
the federal government itself.  Also unlike the “general” common law, this law 
is “federal” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause and therefore has 
preemptive effect. 
The new federal common law raises few separation of powers or 
federalism concerns so long as courts are simply filling in the gaps of a federal 
statute.  The reason is that Congress has made the primary legislative judgment 
in such cases and the states are politically represented in that process.  In 
admiralty, however, courts generally make law wholly apart from any federal 
statute, and the separation of powers and federalism problems become more 
compelling. 
In his introduction, Professor Goldstein rightly points out that Erie has not 
generally been applied to admiralty.24 But it is insufficient simply to cite Pope 
& Talbot25 and conclude that “the Erie limitation did not apply at sea.”26 The 
 
 21. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and 
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1478-93 (1997); Martha A. Field, 
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 924 (1986).  See 
also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640 (stating the ordinary rule that 
instances of appropriate federal common lawmaking are “few and restricted”). 
 22. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) (holding 
that federalism is protected primarily through the states’ representation in Congress, rather than 
through substantive judicial review of federal legislation); Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the 
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (making a similar argument). 
 23. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 383 (1964). 
 24. Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in Admiralty: An Introduction to the Beginning 
of an Exchange, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1337, 1344 (1999).  It might not be unfair, however, to 
characterize such decisions as Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), as doing 
exactly that. 
 25. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).  As I have pointed out elsewhere, 
Pope & Talbot did not directly address the basic Erie issue – whether Erie would not apply as 
given.  See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 311-12 (1999).  In 
any event, asserting that Erie not apply simply because it wasn’t an admiralty case is rather like 
saying Erie was decided on a Tuesday, while Pope & Talbot came down on a Wednesday.  It is 
the scope of the underlying justification that matters. 
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question is why this should be so.  My argument is that this limitation on Erie 
rests on two equally shaky pillars: a generalized policy argument for 
uniformity that has been increasingly rejected as a basis for federal common 
law in other areas,27 and a set of historical assumptions about the nature of 
maritime law in the 18th and 19th centuries that is simply mistaken.28 The 
continuing confusion in the area of maritime federalism29 reflects the 
inadequacy of these foundations, which have failed to resolve the basic 
underlying tension between Jensen and the structural principles that Erie 
recognized. 
Professor Goldstein also seeks to minimize this tension by harmonizing 
Jensen’s strong rule of maritime preemption with the “process federalism” 
doctrine of Garcia.30 Goldstein’s argument is that Jensen’s maritime 
preemption regime satisfies Garcia, since Congress is always free to override 
federal common law created by admiralty courts.31 But Goldstein concedes that 
 
 26. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1344.  See also Theodore F. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 
and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1950) (arguing prior to Pope & 
Talbot that Erie should not be applied to admiralty). 
 27. Professor Stevens, for example, rested his argument against importing Erie into 
admiralty upon this ground.  See Stevens, supra note 26, at 268-70.  But the Court has shown 
little sympathy for such generalized pleas for uniformity as a basis for federal common law, 
particularly in recent years.  See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997) (“To invoke 
the concept of ‘uniformity’ . . .  is not to prove its need.”); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 
U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (rejecting “that most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests, 
the interest in uniformity”); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979) 
(rejecting “generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting 
state law would adversely affect administration of the federal programs”). 
 28. See infra Part II.A.  My argument concerning the 19th century practice under Swift v. 
Tyson is not so much that Jensen is “a relic of the rejected Swift v. Tyson era,” Goldstein supra 
note 24, at 1341, but rather that Jensen is unfaithful even to the practice of that time.  See infra at 
Part III.B. see also Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 25, at 318-28.  For that reason, Jensen 
can find no historical warrant in the historical treatment of maritime law during the 19th century. 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  While it is always 
a pleasure to find areas of agreement with my friend Joel Goldstein, his suggestion that I share his 
“admiration” for Garcia may be going a little far.  Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1344.  By 
suggesting that “process federalism” is a sufficient protection for state autonomy and authority, 
Garcia undermined the foundations of constitutional government.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 566-
67 (Powell, J., dissenting); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. 
L. REV. 1709 (1985).  But it is equally true that critics of Garcia may have overlooked process 
federalism’s protential to support more secure protections for state authority than currently exist 
in many areas of the law.  See generally Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Future of Federalism, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. __ (forthcoming).  The area of maritime preemption is 
a good example, since the current regime under Jensen would be unconstitutional even under 
Garcia. 
 31. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1345.  Some of Professor Goldstein’s admiralty colleagues 
might argue that Congress cannot, in fact, override the common law of admiralty – especially if 
Congress is acting to restore regulatory authority to individual state governments.  See, e.g., 
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Jensen shifts the burden of overcoming legislative inertia from those who 
would have federal law trump state law – who must shoulder it under 
traditional preemption principles – to those who would revive superseded state 
authority.32  This difference is by no means “trivial and inconsequential”;33 
indeed, it ignores the important sense in which legislative inertia, as well as the 
difficult institutional barriers that any legislative proposal must overcome 
before being enacted in federal law under Article I, are the primary “political 
safeguards of federalism.”34 
Frequently, admiralty judges are particularly eager to circumvent these 
safeguards because they view the maritime law as a complete common law 
system. Most common law systems are supposed to have “no gaps in the law” 
— questions of first impression are to be answered by inference from the 
resolution of related issues, policy judgments, and the like.35  Courts don’t give 
a non liquet judgment – “the law is not clear.” 
This is the way state legal systems work.  State statutes are largely 
interstitial additions to the background common law framework.  It is 
emphatically not the way federal law works.  Congress legislates interstitially 
against the background of state law, and federal common law is made in the 
interstices of federal statutes.36 
This highlights the primary constraint on federal law – the practical limits 
on Congress’s ability to get things done.  These limits ensure that there are 
gaps in federal law, and those gaps leave breathing space for state regulatory 
 
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1920) (striking down federal statute 
explicitly permitting application of state workers’ compensation statutes to maritime cases).  The 
conventional wisdom – in the federal courts community, at least – is that Knickerbocker Ice was a 
product of the Lochner period and would not be followed today.  See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET 
AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 893 n.5 (3d ed. 
1988).  The fact that the Knickerbocker Ice view is still taken seriously in admiralty circles, see, 
e.g., David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 1, 19-33 (1997); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-1, 
at 6 (2d ed. 1994), shows how far these two segments of legal academia have diverged on basic 
issues of federalism and separation of powers. 
 32. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1345. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 30; Bradford R. Clark, Federal 
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (1996) (observing 
that the Art. I process is designed “to make the exercise of [federal] governmental authority . . . 
more difficult.  The Constitution thus reserves substantial lawmaking power to the states and the 
people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal government and by rendering that 
government frequently incapable of exercising them”). 
 35. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 67 (1981); Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 573 (1985). 
 36. See BATOR, supra note 31, at 533. 
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authority even in a world where state and federal regulatory jurisdiction largely 
overlap. 
But admiralty is very different.  The law of the sea is a freestanding 
common law system, and it has generally been treated as subject to the rule of 
completeness.  When an admiralty case raises a question on which there is no 
preexisting rule, federal admiralty judges tend to act like Ronald Dworkin’s 
Hercules, creating a new rule by drawing on the more general principles and 
policies of the maritime law.37  They don’t always do this, of course, but when 
they don’t admiralty scholars tend to take the judges to task for not living up to 
their responsibilities.38 
In other words, federal admiralty courts aren’t like Congress, which may 
decide to respect state interests by not legislating at all and which, in any 
event, is constrained by inertia from regulating very much.  Admiralty courts 
are instead like little lawmaking machines which can’t help but create the law 
necessary to answer any question that is put to them. Robins Dry Dock is an 
example: There was no deliberate decision in that case that a federal rule was 
necessary on the issue of purely economic losses.  Rather, the issue simply 
came up in an admiralty case, and the Court was obliged to provide an answer.  
But once that rule was out there, it had a potentially preemptive effect on the 
ability of states to answer the question differently.39 
The last piece of the puzzle is the rules that ordinarily govern preemption 
cases.  The old rule was one of automatic field preemption—any federal 
involvement in a field preempted that field.  This rule became untenable when 
the federal government became involved in numerous fields under the New 
Deal.40 
The modern rule allows preemption of state law only where Congress 
specifically intends it to occur.41  And there is a presumption in interpreting 
federal statutes that Congress does not intend to preempt unless it clearly says 
so.42  By forcing a deliberate decision by Congress before preemption occurs, 
the presumption ensures that the political safeguards of federalism have a 
chance to operate.  As the Court explained in Gregory v. Ashcroft: 
 
 37. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977) (describing 
Hercules’ methodology). 
 38. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part 
II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 580 (1997) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s “recent retreat from 
its role of expositor of general maritime law”). 
 39. See, e.g., IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee S.S., 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 40. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
767 (1994). 
 41. See id. at 805. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 
(1986); Gardbaum, supra note 40, at 805. 
 42. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; 
Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. at 230. 
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[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process 
the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an 
exercise.  ‘To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere 
congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on 
which Garcia relied to protect states’ interests.’43 
Jensen turns this rule on its head.  If Congress passes a law, the 
presumption is that it does not preempt state law.  But if a federal judge makes 
up a rule of admiralty, it almost always does preempt state law even though 
Congress has never acted at all. 
It should not be surprising that Jensen works this way – when it was 
decided, the rule was that preemption broadly follows from any federal 
involvement in the field. So because admiralty was clearly a “federal” field for 
some purposes, it had to be federal for all.  But that isn’t the way preemption 
works anymore, and the maritime practice has failed to reflect that. 
That’s the prima facie case against a strong, special rule of maritime 
preemption.  Such a rule violates Erie’s principle of judicial federalism by 
permitting federal courts to displace state law even though they do not purport 
to be interpreting or filling in the gaps of a federal statute.  And Jensen’s rule 
also violates modern preemption rules by permitting preemption without a 
clear showing that Congress intended such preemption to occur. 
III. THE HISTORY 
Admiralty people tend to answer these kinds of criticisms with a historical 
argument.  That argument can take one of two forms: An originalist argument, 
based on the claim that the Framers intended the admiralty clause to provide a 
uniform substantive law governing maritime commerce, or a more 
evolutionary argument, emphasizing the years of precedent and practice that 
have built up around Jensen’s rule.44  Even taking these arguments on their 
own methodological terms,45 neither one is persuasive. 
 
 43. 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 44. I am not, as Professor Force suggests, see Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common 
Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 1368-9 (1999), arguing that a correct historical 
construction of the Admiralty Clause should trump pragmatic considerations.  Rather, history and 
pragmatics are two distinct sorts of arguments usually advanced by Jensen’s defenders to justify a 
departure from generally accepted rules governing preemption and federal common law.  In any 
event, as I explain below, pragmatic considerations actually favor abandoning Jensen.  See infra 
Part IV.A. 
 45. Of course, one need not accept the originalist premises of Jensen’s defenders.  I, for one, 
do not. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994) (offering a conservative critique of 
originalism).  For example, there are strong arguments for strictly enforcing the limits on 
preemption and federal common law embodied in current case law as a necessary counterweight 
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A. Originalist History 
My review of the history leads me to accept the proposition that the 
Framers intended for federal courts to apply a common law of admiralty, 
sometimes called the “Law of the Sea.”  But this doesn’t justify a broad rule of 
maritime preemption for two reasons: 
1. The Purpose of the Admiralty Grant 
First, the general purpose of the admiralty grant appears to have been 
intended to cover three types of specialized cases which can be grouped 
together as “public law” cases: (1) prize and capture cases; (2) crimes 
committed on the high seas, such as piracy; and (3) offenses against the federal 
revenue laws, which at that time relied heavily on maritime commerce.46  
These public law categories are relatively unimportant to the modern admiralty 
docket, which is dominated by private law claims.  We have little need for 
prize jurisdiction, as Preble Stolz pointed out, because “civilization has 
matured to the point that ships are sunk rather than stolen.”47  If the sorts of 
cases that motivated the drafters of the Admiralty Clause are largely gone 
today, it seems difficult to justify a departure from Erie and the normal 
preemption rules on originalist grounds. 
The best answer to this point is that the Framers were pretty clearly aware 
that the admiralty grant would also cover private maritime claims.  We know 
this from Jonathan Gutoff’s work demonstrating that there were already a good 
number of these cases in the admiralty courts by 1789.48  But the reasons for 
creating federal admiralty jurisdiction seem to have had much more to do with 
the need to treat foreigners fairly and to speak with a unified national voice on 
issues that might affect foreign relations.  These rationales apply primarily to 
the “public law” sorts of cases.  To the extent that fair treatment of foreigners 
in private law cases was a concern  – for instance, in international trade cases, 
analogous to modern-day COGSA, charter-party, and marine insurance 
litigation involving parties from different nations – that concern seems 
 
to the Twentieth Century expansion of federal power, regardless of whether the Framers actually 
envisioned those particular limitations on the federal government. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, 
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125.  In any event, the 
originalist evidence actually undermines Jensen’s validity. 
 46. See Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REV. 661, 
669-70 (1963).  See generally William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in 
an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993). Professor 
Casto’s account relies heavily on Attorney General Edmund Randolph’s report to Congress on 
the newly created federal judicial system.  See H.R. REP. NO. 1-17 (1790), reprinted in 1 AM. 
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 21 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1834). 
 47. Stolz, supra note 46, at 669. 
 48. See also Jonathan M. Gutoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Review of State-
Court Decisionmaking, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 n.25 (1996). 
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identical to the concern for out-of-state American litigants that gave rise to the 
diversity jurisdiction.49  In other words, the Framers’ awareness of private law 
admiralty claims may justify a federal forum, but not a uniform federal law 
governing such claims. 
2. The Nature of the Law of the Sea 
The second—and more important—point is that the nature of maritime law 
in the Founding era provides a compelling originalist argument against 
Jensen.50  While the Framers assumed that the admiralty courts would apply 
the Law of the Sea in maritime cases, that law was a branch of the law of 
nations – much like the law merchant applied in commercial cases under Swift 
v. Tyson.51 
There is abundant research to show that the law merchant was not viewed 
as federal in nature – rather, it was a system jointly administered by state and 
federal courts.52  Although all courts strove for uniformity, state courts were 
not bound to follow federal decisions construing the law merchant, and vice 
versa.53 
Although the evidence is limited regarding the maritime law, it is clear that 
the Law of the Sea was also derived from the law of nations.54  Indeed, in 
many cases — such as marine insurance — the maritime law dealt with the 
same sorts of issues.  For that reason, adherence to the original understanding 
would mean treating the general maritime law as neither state nor federal, even 
though that law was primarily administered by the federal courts.  As Chief 
Justice Marshall put it: “A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the 
 
 49. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 n.6 
(1995) (reading Hamilton’s argument for federal admiralty jurisdiction in THE FEDERALIST NO. 
80 as indicating “a concern with local bias similar to the presupposition for diversity 
jurisdiction”).  Uniformity concerns exist, of course, in private international trade cases.  But as I 
later argue, these concerns are no different from those that exist, say, in multinational non-marine 
insurance transactions, or in other multinational transactions arising from an increasingly global 
economy.  Moreover, it is important to realize that the federal diversity courts’ role in land-based 
commercial cases also had a uniformity component in the Nineteenth Century.  See, e.g., Swift v. 
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  That role ended with Erie in diversity cases, and the history 
provides no justification for why admiralty should be treated differently.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 50. It is important to underscore the fact that this argument is wholly independent of the 
Casto-Gutoff debate about the sorts of cases upon which the Framers’ focused in drafting the 
Admiralty Clause. 
 51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 52. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). 
 53. See, e.g., Delmas v. Insurance Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 665-66 (1871) (holding that a 
commercial issue on appeal from a state supreme court did not raise a federal question); Waln v. 
Thompson, 9 Serg. & Rawle 115, 121-22 (Pa. 1822) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of general commercial law was only persuasive authority). 
 54. See, e.g., Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 34, at 1280-81. 
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Constitution or laws of the United States.  These cases are as old as navigation 
itself; and the law admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied 
by our courts to the cases as they arise.”55 
The best evidence for this view is the fact that the general maritime law 
survived the founding era at all.  This was a time of great hostility to the very 
idea of federal common law, illustrated by Madison’s Report on the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions and culminating in the Court’s rejection of a federal 
common law of crimes in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin.56  Madison’s 
discussion makes clear that one reason for this hostility was fear that extensive 
federal common law would broadly preempt state regulatory authority: 
[T]he consequence of admitting the common law as the law of the United 
States, on the authority of the individual States, is as obvious as it would be 
fatal.  As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be 
paramount to the Constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it 
would overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the States, and by one 
constructive operation new model the whole political fabric of the country.57 
This hostility was never directed at Swift’s law merchant, precisely because 
that law was not perceived as “federal” or preemptive.  I submit that the reason 
that maritime law survived is the same: it was not perceived as “federal” either. 
What happened with Jensen, I think, is that changing jurisprudential 
attitudes created a need to shoehorn admiralty law into either a “state” or 
“federal” box.  For Holmes, it belonged in the state box; meanwhile, the 
Jensen majority, the “federal” box.  Either way, this was a new development in 
1917, and admiralty law history cannot be used to justify it. 
B. Common Law History 
Whatever the original intent of the Admiralty Clause, a more evolutionary 
or “common law” perspective on history58 might still try to justify Jensen’s 
strong rule of maritime preemption with a different argument.  The claim 
would be that it is simply too late in the day to uproot the decades of practice 
and precedent that have grown up in this area since 1917.59  I’m a good enough 
 
 55. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828). 
 56. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).  For discussion of the hostility to federal common law 
during this period, see generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137-42 (1996) (Souter, 
J., dissenting); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 
(1985); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 
(1985). 
 57. Report on the Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799-1800, in 6 WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 381 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
 58. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CH. L. 
REV. 877 (1996); Young Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 45. 
 59. Professor Friedell raises a related point by suggesting that Congress somehow ratified 
Jensen’s extension of federal judicial authority in passing the Admiralty Extension Act (“AEA”), 
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Burkean not to quarrel with this argument in principle: If it ain’t broke, we 
should think twice before we try to fix it. 
The problem is that maritime preemption is broke.  The Supreme Court has 
decided fifty-three cases on this issue since Jensen.  Yet each of the most 
recent cases includes an apology from the Court for the conflicting law it has 
created in this area.60  If you go through the post-Jensen case law, you can 
count at least five different analytical frameworks to explain when state law 
might apply in admiralty.  The Court has, at various times, distinguished 
between maritime “rights” and “remedies;”61 identified “gaps” in the maritime 
law that may be filled by state law;62 cordoned off subjects that are “maritime 
and local,”63 resorted to “balancing” and “accommodation;”64 and drew a line 
between substance and procedure.65  But, none of these frameworks explains 
more than a small fraction of the cases, and even advocates of a strong federal 
judicial lawmaking role in admiralty concede that the Court has yet to settle on 
 
46 U.S.C. § 740.  Friedell, supra note 14, 1389-90.  It is an open question whether Congress 
could delegate carte blanche lawmaking power to federal courts; such a delegation would evade 
the Article I limitations that normally cabin federal lawmaking.  See Clark, supra note 21, at 1461 
(noting the difficulty of negotiating the Article I process functions as a substantial constraint on 
federal regulatory power).  At the very least, the Court has required a clear statement of 
Congress’ intent to delegate so broadly, and the Admiralty Extension Act says nothing at all 
about substantive lawmaking authority.  See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).  Nor does the Act purport to convey any powers to 
federal courts in cases arising within the pre-Extension Act jurisdiction. 
  It is plausible, moreover, that the Admiralty Extension Act was intended primarily to 
provide that the same law govern actions arising on navigable waters and at the waterside, not 
that this law necessarily be federal. See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 14, at 512 (“It is clear from its 
legislative history that the primary purpose of the Act was to eliminate the inconsistent and unfair 
results that could arise from adjudicating the cross claims in allision cases according to different 
and conflicting legal principles.”).  Professor Galligan seemingly assumes that inconsistencies 
would be eliminated by applying federal maritime law across the board, rather than state law, but 
neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history he quotes says this.  In fact, the statute is 
carefully worded to say simply that Extension Act suits will be brought “according to the 
principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining” in maritime cases generally, without 
entering into the Jensen debate about whether those principles should be federal in all cases.  46 
U.S.C. app. § 740 (1994).  While the drafters of the AEA may have had some expectation that the 
extension of maritime jurisdiction would have certain substantive consequences, that unexpressed 
intention is hardly sufficient to foreclose general reconsideration of federal common lawmaking 
authority in admiralty.  See Galligan, supra note 14, at 514-15. 
 60. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8 (1996); American 
Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452. 
 61. Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918). 
 62. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 241 (1921). 
 63. Id. at 242. 
 64. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739-40 (1961). 
 65. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452-53. 
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a workable approach.66  Most memorably, Professor David Currie’s influential 
treatment of this subject is entitled The Devil’s Own Mess.67 
So the accumulation of precedent is hardly a compelling reason to abrogate 
the general Erie and preemption rules—if anything, the record of Jensen’s 
progeny cuts in the opposite direction. 
IV. UNIFORMITY AND MARITIME COMMERCE 
The other argument that admiralty experts generally raise in defense of 
Jensen is the policy argument for federal uniformity in maritime law: Maritime 
commerce will suffer, they say, if it is subject to fifty different state legal 
regimes.  I think this argument proves little even if true, and it rather 
dramatically exaggerates the risks involved in bringing vertical choice of law 
rules in admiralty in line with those governing the other heads of federal 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Significance of Disuniformity 
The short answer is that Jensen is unconstitutional, and no policy 
arguments will change that.  Our system of government leaves us little choice, 
as Gary Lawson has said, but to “hold fast to the Constitution though the 
heavens may fall.”68  While pragmatic concerns enter into constitutional law in 
a number of contexts, the fact that a particular legal regime is more efficient or 
represents better policy will rarely save an otherwise unconstitutional law.69  
The Constitution frequently chooses other values—such as democracy, 
decentralization, and checks and balances—over efficiency, and nowhere is 
this more accurate than in the fields of federalism and separation of powers. 
There are, moreover, good reasons to doubt whether the heavens will really 
fall if Erie is applied in admiralty.  Uniformity is not any more important in 
maritime commerce than it is in interstate or international financial 
transactions, interstate trucking, or air commerce.  Yet, we do not have a 
special, uniform body of law that governs these areas to the exclusion of state 
 
 66. See Robertson, supra note 17, at 91-97 (surveying the case law); Michael F. Sturley, 
Federal-State Relations: Was Preble Stolz Right?, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317, 323 (1998) 
(observing that “[t]his mess is causing real confusion for the lower courts and the bar”). 
 67. David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 SUP. 
CT. REV. 158. 
 68. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1249 (1994). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act over a dissent emphasizing the critical importance of gun-free schools); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto over a dissent extolling the 
pragmatic virtues of the procedures). 
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law.70  Would each of these areas benefit (pragmatically speaking) from a set 
of uniform federal rules?  Perhaps.  But that is not the question.  The relative 
health of many industries involving multi-jurisdictional activity that remain 
subject to diverse state legal regimes suggests that adding maritime commerce 
to this category would not prompt the sort of catastrophe that might tempt us to 
bend the rules of federalism and separation of powers.71 
Finally, it is critical to recognize that the various exceptions and 
qualifications that have arisen to permit some use of state law under Jensen 
have scotched any hope of predictability in this area, so that we aren’t really 
getting the benefit of uniform federal rules anyway.  For example, the 
confusion caused by applying state law to marine insurance (sometimes) has 
been an open scandal for decades.72  It seems likely that freely embracing Erie 
would at least clear up the confusion as to the applicable choice of law rules.  
In any event, the fact that marine undertakings continue to be insured despite 
the uncertainties caused by Wilburn Boat suggests that maritime commerce is 
more resilient in the face of diverse legal regimes than Jensen’s defenders 
seem willing to concede.  But if the defense of Jensen ultimately comes down 
to Professor Friedell’s concession that “[t]he law in this area is a mess.  But it 
is our mess, and it serves a purpose,”73 then the strong uniformity argument for 
Jensen seems fundamentally misplaced. 
B. Uniformity Without Jensen 
Where uniformity is essential, there are other means of preserving it.  
Maritime law is increasingly governed by federal statute74 – and one suspects 
that these statutes are passed to cover the issues in which Congress thinks that 
 
 70. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997) (noting that the daily activities of 
national banks are governed primarily by state law); Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express 
Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1249-51 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing, in the absence of statutory authorization, 
to create a uniform federal cause of action concerning the pricing practices of airborne freight 
carriers).  Interestingly enough, the uniformity of the general commercial law was probably the 
most powerful argument for adhering to the Swift regime in the Nineteenth century.  See Railroad 
Co. v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 41-42 (1880) (Clifford, J., concurring); TONY FREYER, 
HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 82-84 (1981).  
Yet, commercial law has muddled through despite the revolution worked by Erie. 
 71. Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979) (rejecting 
“generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law 
would adversely affect administration of [specific] federal programs”). 
 72. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part 
I), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 395, 398 (1997); Michael F. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine 
Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 41, 42-43 
(1998). 
 73. Friedell, supra note 14, at 1393. 
 74. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (discussing maritime tort 
law). 
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uniformity is most important.  Although I question the bootstrapping theory 
that bases Congress’ “admiralty” power on judicial jurisdiction, it is clear that 
these statutes are permitted under the Commerce Clause.  Normal preemption 
rules should apply to these statutes, and in fact that is the way the Court has 
generally treated them.75  Although enacting federal legislation is always a 
difficult process—as the Framers most surely intended—the maritime industry 
seems precisely the type of focused, cohesive interest group that has 
traditionally been effective at getting things done on Capitol Hill.76 
As Professor Force points out, critical areas of maritime law remain 
dominated by common law rather than federal statutes.77  In some of these 
areas, state law may be an adequate substitute—particularly in those areas 
where the various state laws are already relatively uniform due to adoption of 
Restatements or uniform laws.78  It seems likely that abandonment of Jensen 
might encourage similar further efforts in the maritime area; my colleague 
Michael Sturley, for example, has urged adoption of a Restatement of Marine 
Insurance Law as a solution to the problems arising from Wilburn Boat.79 
In areas where the dominance of federal maritime law has left state law 
undeveloped, it is important to remember that a decision overruling Jensen 
would not require that prior admiralty opinions be expunged from the federal 
reports.  Those decisions would remain available to state courts and to federal 
courts sitting in admiralty as potentially persuasive statements of maritime law, 
much as federal commercial decisions were available as persuasive authority to 
state courts deciding commercial issues under Swift v. Tyson in the Nineteenth 
Century.80  Here, again, the project of compiling a Restatement of maritime 
principles in particular areas would aid the development of state law governing 
these issues and help to ensure some degree of uniformity.81 
 
 75. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Kelly v. Washington 
ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).  It is, of course, highly ironic that the presumption against 
preemption already applies in the areas where Congress feels uniformity is most important, but 
preemption is favored in areas that Congress has chosen to leave alone. 
 76. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986) (suggesting that 
small, cohesive interests are most effective at getting favorable legislation passed). 
 77. See, e.g., Force, supra note 44, at 1371-72 (discussing charter parties). 
 78. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 3-1 
to 3-5, at 93-100 (2d ed. 1975) (noting the use of the Uniform Commercial Code in governing 
bills of lading). 
 79. See Sturley, supra note 66, at 42. 
 80. See Fletcher, supra note 52, at 1549.  As Judge Fletcher’s research demonstrates, the 
Swift model—under which both state and federal courts strove for uniformity despite not being 
directly bound by the others’ decisions—was relatively successful so long as it was confined to a 
relatively narrow subject area.  See id. at 1554. 
 81. I have reservations about Professor Sturley’s project as it applies to marine insurance in 
particular.  Because of Wilburn Boat, Professor Sturley suggests, the federal admiralty courts 
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Nor would adoption of Erie require federal courts wholly to abandon their 
own substantive lawmaking jurisdiction.  Those courts would continue to make 
maritime law in cases that fall outside the legislative competence of the States 
– where the events at issue happen outside the three-mile limit, for example.  
As long as this body of law exists, it is available to govern cases of particularly 
strong federal interest under normal conflicts of law principles.  In essence, I 
would treat the maritime law as the law of a coequal state, rather than as 
preemptive “federal” law.82  This is largely consistent with the status of 
“general” law prior to Erie and Jensen.  And it should ensure that in cases 
where there is some federal interest unique to admiralty –- and not just an 
undifferentiated interest in uniformity -– federal courts would retain their 
power to protect that interest by making rules of common law.83 
The problem remains of deliberate state departures from uniformity.  But 
here the dormant Commerce Clause is available to police state efforts to 
interfere with maritime commerce.84  Maritime commerce is no less 
“commerce” because it is maritime.85  And state attempts to discriminate 
against such commerce or impose excessive burdens on it would be 
unconstitutional under established Commerce Clause doctrine with or without 
Jensen.86 
 
have not developed a uniform law of marine insurance.  See Sturley, supra note 66, at 54-55.  If 
that is the case, then what would a Restatement re-state?  To the extent that admiralty courts have 
been applying general principles of state insurance law to marine cases, this will limit the 
American Law Institute’s ability to formulate a set of rules optimized for the marine insurance 
industry.  The persuasive authority of the Restatements, after all, has always depended largely on 
the assumption that these documents represent a distillation of the decisional law as it already 
exists.  Restatement authors, of course, frequently must choose the “best” among conflicting 
rules, and the kind of knowledgeable consideration that the ALI could bring to this task would 
likely be of great benefit to courts.  Those courts must recognize, however, that their authority to 
adopt a Restatement view that differs from state law in the marine insurance field is no greater 
than, say, in the field of torts or contracts.  A Restatement approach thus seems quite limited in its 
ability to serve as an alternative to the messy and onerous route of legislation.  See id. at 53 & 
n.105. 
 82. For a fuller discussion, see Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 
353-58. 
 83. Such interests might dictate, for example, that federal law governs cases implicating 
foreign relations; however, these cases might be better described as subject to the doctrine of 
foreign affairs preemption.  See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
 84. Likewise, as already noted, some such laws would be preempted by federal control over 
foreign affairs.  See id. at 440-41.  Given the pervasive international implications of state 
regulation in a global economy, of course, the foreign affairs preemption doctrine is badly in need 
of a limiting principle.  That problem is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 85. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) (holding that “commerce” 
includes navigation). 
 86. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996); Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970). 
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CONCLUSION 
In concluding, I want to emphasize that much of what I have said is not 
new.  No one has demonstrated the present doctrinal disarray in this area more 
persuasively than David Robertson.87  And Preble Stolz argued over thirty-five 
years ago that, at least in some areas, admiralty was ousting state regulatory 
authority in areas of important state interests.88  But while the pages of the 
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce have been filled with various proposals 
for charting a course between federal and state dominance — Professor 
Robertson alone has two different entries89  — I’m proposing that it’s time to 
abandon ship.  There is simply no constitutional mandate for treating the basic 
common law powers of the federal courts differently here than in other areas, 
or for applying different rules of preemption in admiralty.  Nor will the sky 
fall, as a practical matter, if Erie is applied in maritime cases. 
I think this is where the Court is headed after American Dredging and 
Yamaha.  American Dredging offered only the most tepid of endorsements in 
refusing to overrule Jensen, while Yamaha ignored Jensen entirely.90  And 
even my colleagues on this panel, who have adopted a more traditional view of 
the supremacy of federal maritime law, seem unwilling to defend Jensen 
itself.91  But even if Jensen is teetering on the brink of extinction, it could still 
use a good strong push.  And any regime that replaces Jensen will succeed 
only if it is consistent with the general principles of federalism and separation 
of powers that order vertical choice of law problems generally. 
 
 
 87. See generally Robertson, supra note 17; David W. Robertson, Displacement of State 
Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325 (1995). 
 88. See Stolz, supra note 46, at 661-65. 
 89. See Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, supra note 86, at 
357; David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a 
National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 292-95 (1998). 
 90. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 447 n.1 (1994); Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215 n.13 (1996) 
(noting state authority over maritime cases without mentioning Jensen). 
 91. See Force, supra note 44, at 1384-87; Friedell, supra note 14, at 1390, 1393. 
